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Abstract 
 
This research is aimed at understanding emotional processing, trauma experiences, and 
PTSD. One of the first steps taken in this program of research was to use an underutilized 
method of examining emotional processing, facial affect recognition.  In Study 1, I created a new 
stimulus set of facial expressions and contextual backgrounds, the Contextual Recognition of 
Affect Faces Task (CRAFT), in which participants view faces displaying different facial 
expressions (i.e., neutral, happiness, fear, sadness, and disgust) superimposed upon emotionally 
valenced (i.e., happiness, fear, sadness, and disgust) and neutral images. In the process of 
developing the task and using it for research with non-trauma controls, I found that context 
matters in facial affect recognition judgments. Individuals were generally more accurate when 
the emotion of the face and context matched and were less accurate when they mismatched. This 
research is described in Chapter 2.   
I then used my task to examine the relation between PTSD symptoms factors 
(specifically EN) and sensitivity to emotional context in a sample of 90 individuals with trauma 
histories (Study 2). This research is described in detail in Chapter 3, in which I found that the 
facial affect recognition performance of individuals with high levels of EN was more strongly 
affected by emotional context than was the facial affect recognition performance of individuals 
with low levels of EN. I then conducted a study using eye tracking to explore one potential 
mechanism underlying the relation between contextual emotional processing and EN among 
trauma survivors (Study 3).  This research is summarized in Chapter 4.  After presenting the 
research conducted to date, I will end with a brief description of future directions for research. 
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Chapter 1 
General Introduction 
 
Trauma 
According to the DSM-IV (APA, 1994), a traumatic event is characterized as an event 
that poses a potential or actual threat of death and/or serious injury or an actual or potential threat 
to one’s physical integrity. The individual experiencing the traumatic event often responds with 
feelings of helplessness, horror, and/or terror. Examples of a traumatic event include: 
transportation accidents, physical assault with or without a weapon, sexual assault, sudden death 
of someone close to you, and military and warzone exposure. Sadly enough, a large portion of 
individuals in the United States have experienced a traumatic event at some point in their 
lifetime. In large epidemiological studies, Resnick et al. (1993), Kessler et al. (1995), and 
Breslau (2009) found that approximately three-quarters of the population has experienced a 
traumatic life event. In general, men are more likely than are women to experience traumatic 
events (Breslau, 2009). 
 
Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
Among all of the diagnoses listed in the DSM-IV (APA, 1994), Post-traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) is the only disorder with a specified and required cause, a preceding traumatic 
event. The lifetime prevalence of PTSD in the United States has been found to be approximately 
10% (12.3% as reported by Resnick et al., 1993; 8% as reported by Keane et al., 2006). 
Numerous studies have found that women are twice as likely as men to develop PTSD (e.g., 
2 
 
Breslau, 2009; Kessler et al., 1995; for a review of possible explanations see Tolin & Foa, 2006). 
Breslau (2009) reported that slightly less than 10% of trauma victims developed PTSD. 
Researchers have found that individuals with PTSD also have high rates of comorbidity 
with other disorders, especially depression, substance abuse, and other anxiety disorders (Orsillo 
et al., 1996; Kessler et al., 1995). There are higher prevalence rates of health problems in trauma 
survivors with PTSD than in trauma survivors without PTSD (Schnurr & Green, 2004). 
Additionally, PTSD has been found to result in economic cost (e.g., work days lost) and poor 
quality of life (Foa, Hembree & Rothbaum, 2007). Therefore, in addition to causing debilitating 
psychological distress to the sufferers, PTSD also has strong negative implications for public 
health and the economy (Foa et al., 2007). Studies have found that if PTSD persists for a year 
after trauma exposure it is very unlikely to remit without psychological intervention/treatment 
(Kessler et al., 1995). 
While exposure to a traumatic event is necessary to be diagnosed with PTSD, it is not 
sufficient. The traumatic event must meet specific criteria and the individual must experience a 
specified combination of symptoms to be diagnosed with PTSD.  As described above, the 
traumatic event must: (1) pose a potential or actual threat of death, serious injury, or threat to 
one’s physical integrity; and (2) evoke feelings of helplessness, horror, and/or terror.   
Additionally, according to the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 1994), there are 17 symptoms that individuals 
with PTSD can experience: (1) intrusive memories; (2) nightmares; (3) flashbacks; (4) cue 
distress; (5) cue reactivity; (6) avoid thoughts/feelings; (7) avoid people/places; (8) restricted 
affect; (9) diminished interest; (10) detachment; (11) foreshortened future; (12) amnesia; (13) 
disturbed sleep; (14) anger outbursts; (15) poor concentration; (16) hypervigilance; and (17) 
exaggerated startle. PTSD itself is generally believed to be composed of several symptom 
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clusters or factors which reflect underlying dimensions of the disorder.  The DSM-IV (APA, 
1994) divides the symptoms into three clusters: re-experiencing, avoidance and numbing, and 
hyperarousal. An individual must report one re-experiencing symptom (symptoms 1-5 above), 
three avoidance and numbing symptoms (symptoms 6-12 above), and two hyperarousal 
symptoms (symptoms 13-17 above).  
The DSM-IV three-cluster PTSD symptom structure (i.e., re-experiencing, avoidance and 
numbing, and hyperarousal) has received very little empirical support.  As reviewed by Palmieri, 
Weathers, Difede, and King (2007b), one of the most viable accounts of PTSD symptom factors 
parses symptoms into a four-factor model: reexperiencing, avoidance, hyperarousal, and 
emotional numbing (EN).  This four-factor model has been supported by research by DuHamel 
et al. (2004),  King, Leskin, King, and Weathers (1998), McWilliams, Cox, and Asmundsen 
(2005), Palmieri and Fitzgerald (2005), and Palmieri, Marshall, and Schell (2007a).  
 
Emotional Numbing (EN) 
Emotional Numbing (EN), a restricted range of affect, is the cardinal symptom of the EN 
factor described above.  EN has been found to be related to a decrease in resiliency resources for 
individuals with trauma exposure (Johnson, Palimieri, Jackson, & Hobfoll, 2007) and to be 
closely associated with interpersonal impairment in individuals with war-zone related PTSD 
(Ruscio, Weathers, King, & King, 2002), suggesting that further research on EN is warranted.  
Although the majority of research and theoretical papers involving trauma have focused on 
PTSD as a whole and not individual symptoms, multiple researchers have proposed hypotheses 
to account for EN. For example, Keane et al. (1985) proposed that EN is avoidance behavior 
protecting an individual from re-experiencing any pain associated with the trauma. Additionally, 
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Litz et al. (1997) posited that EN results when an individual’s attention is over-taxed and 
exhausted due to hyperarousal that results post-trauma. Furthermore, Milanak and Berenbaum 
(2009) theorized that EN is associated with disturbances in emotion regulation processes rather 
than simply disturbances in emotional responsivity.  
Numerous researchers have examined how PTSD is associated with disturbances in 
emotional processing.  Drawing on the work of Rachman (1980, 2001), we define emotional 
processing as converting an emotional stimulus (e.g., a face, a picture, a word) into something 
meaningful - something that can be made sense of and used. Emotional processing also 
encompasses the impact of emotional information on how the stimulus is interpreted, understood, 
recognized, and or stored as a memory, as well as the impact of the emotional stimulus on future 
behaviour.   Investigators have consistently found that individuals with PTSD differ from 
controls in their processing of emotionally valenced stimuli.  Using modified versions of the 
emotional Stroop task, researchers have generally found that individuals with PTSD respond 
differentially to threat words associated specifically with the type of trauma they experienced 
(e.g., words such as crash or highway for individuals who develop PTSD following motor 
vehicle accidents), but do not respond differentially to other threat, positive, or neutral words 
(e.g., McNally, English, & Lipke, 1998; Thrahser & Dalgleish, 1994).  In contrast to the 
extensive research on PTSD as a whole, to our knowledge, only a single study, Milanak and 
Berenbaum (2009), has specifically examined the relation between emotional processing and EN 
(in fact, this is the only study to examine the relation between emotional processing and any 
specific PTSD symptom factor).  Using a word naming priming task, Milanak and Berenbaum 
(2009) found that EN was associated with the degree to which participants took advantage of 
valence information to accelerate the processing of subsequently presented similarly valenced 
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stimuli. The results of Milanak and Berenbaum (2009) suggest that differences in emotional 
processing between individuals with low vs. high levels of EN are most evident when examining 
how exposure to one emotional stimulus influences the processing of other emotional stimuli.  In 
other words, we did not find a main effect for EN, nor an EN x target emotional stimulus 
interaction.  Rather we found an EN x non-target emotional stimulus interaction showing that the 
non-target emotional stimulus influenced how people process the target emotional stimulus. 
These findings are what led Milanak and Berenbaum (2009) to posit that EN is associated with 
disturbances in emotion regulation processes rather than simply disturbances in emotional 
responsivity (as indexed by responses to emotional stimuli presented in isolation).   
 
Facial Affect Recognition 
A potentially fruitful approach to studying EN and the processing of emotional 
information is to use paradigms from other areas of psychology and psychopathology.  In fact, 
based on the evidence suggesting that typical emotional images influence information processing 
more strongly than do typical emotional words (Beall & Herbert, 2008; DeHouwer & Hermans, 
1994), several psychopathology researchers (Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue, & Joormann, 2004; 
Mogg & Bradley, 2005) have recommended using images (and often faces) rather than words.   
One way of studying how individuals are affected by non-target emotional stimuli when 
responding to target emotional stimuli is to take advantage of previous research documenting 
that accuracy judging facial expressions of emotion tends to be enhanced when the faces are 
presented in an emotion-matching context, and tends to be diminished when the faces are 
presented in an emotion-mismatching context (Leppanen & Hietenan, 2003; Righart & 
DeGelder, 2008). A wide variety of contextual cues, such as odors, pictures, and stories, have 
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been found to influence the judgments participants make regarding the emotion being 
experienced by another person (Kim et al., 2004; Carroll & Russell, 1996; Goodenough and 
Tinker, 1931;  Munn, 1940; Fernberger, 1928; Landis, 1929).   However, as discussed in detail in 
Chapter 2, further research concerning the effect of context on facial affect recognition is 
warranted.   
 
Overview 
 Over the past several years, I have been conducting research aimed at understanding 
emotional processing, trauma experiences, and PTSD. One of the first steps taken in this 
program of research was to use an underutilized method of examining emotional processing, 
facial affect recognition.  In Study 1, I created a new stimulus set of facial expressions and 
contextual backgrounds, the Contextual Recognition of Affect Faces Task (CRAFT), in which 
participants view faces displaying different facial expressions (i.e., neutral, happiness, fear, 
sadness, and disgust) superimposed upon emotionally valenced (i.e., happiness, fear, sadness, 
and disgust) and neutral images. In the process of developing the task and using it for research 
with non-trauma controls, I found that context matters in facial affect recognition judgments. 
Individuals were generally more accurate when the emotion of the face and context matched and 
were less accurate when they mismatched. This research is described in Chapter 2.   
I then used my task to examine the relation between PTSD symptoms factors 
(specifically EN) and sensitivity to emotional context in a sample of 90 individuals with trauma 
histories (Study 2). This research is described in detail in Chapter 3, in which I found that the 
facial affect recognition performance of individuals with high levels of EN was more strongly 
affected by emotional context than was the facial affect recognition performance of individuals 
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with low levels of EN. I then conducted a study using eye tracking to explore one potential 
mechanism underlying the relation between contextual emotional processing and EN among 
trauma survivors (Study 3).  This research is summarized in Chapter 4.  After presenting the 
research conducted to date, I will end with a brief description of future directions for research. 
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Chapter 2 
Study 1: The Effects of Context on Facial Affect Recognition 
 
Facial expressions play a critical role in non-verbal communication.  Systematic research 
examining facial affect recognition dating back to Darwin (1872) has found that significant 
deficits and/or biases in affect recognition are common among populations suffering from 
psychological and medical disorders (e.g., Bozikas, Kosmidis, Anezoulaki, Giannakou, & 
Karavatos, 2004; Felmingham, Bryant & Gordon, 2003; McClure, Pope, Hoberman, Pine, & 
Leibenluft, 2003), and such deficits and biases can have a negative effect on interpersonal 
interactions and safety (e.g., Fridlund, 1994; Hofmann, Suvak, & Litz, 2006; Nachson, 1995).   
The majority of previous facial affect recognition research has used pictures of faces 
displayed on a blank background (e.g., Ekman & Frisen, 1975). This research has provided 
critical information regarding which aspects of facial musculature are important for making 
facial affect recognition judgments (e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1975; Sullivan, Ruffman & Hutton, 
2007). However, in real life, facial expressions are exhibited in context. In other words, 
whenever an individual is interacting with someone else and making facial affect recognition 
judgments, they not only perceive the face but also the context in which the ―face‖ is located.   
Imagine the following three scenarios.  In one scenario, all you see is Sara’s face.  In the 
second, you see Sara’s face and you can tell she is at a funeral home.  In the third, you see Sara’s 
face and she is on the Olympic medal podium receiving a gold medal.   One can ask two 
different questions about Sara: (a) what facial expression of emotion is she exhibiting – for 
example, does her face look sad, happy, or neutral; and (b) what is she feeling – for example, is 
she feeling sad, happy, or neutral.  Although one would expect that the judgment of her facial 
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expression would influence the judgment of what she is feeling, the two are not always identical 
– for example, some gold medal winners who feel very happy are crying and appear to have sad 
facial expressions while standing on the podium, and some mourners who feel very sad appear to 
have neutral facial expressions.  From both personal experience and the results of carefully 
conducted research (e.g., Kim et al., 2004; Carroll & Russell, 1996; Goodenough and Tinker, 
1931; Munn, 1940; Fernberger, 1928; Landis, 1929), we know that judgments of what people are 
feeling are influenced by context.  Fernandez –Dols (1999) has clearly articulated how emotional 
facial expressions are not always direct windows into what someone is feeling, how what is on 
the face is not always what the person is feeling, and how context can affect judgments of facial 
expressions. When we see Sara at the funeral home we judge her to be feeling sad even though 
her facial expression is neutral; when we see Sara on the Olympic medal podium we judge her to 
be feeling happy even if her face suggests she is sad.   
The present research explored the impact of context on facial affect recognition.  Context 
can be defined as any information available to the decoder at the time of their judgment, other 
than the facial musculature, that can influence their judgment.  Context information: (a) can be 
gleaned by all of the senses (e.g., visual, auditory, olfactory); (b) can, but need not, be directly 
relevant to the situation or judgment; (c) can be information presented immediately preceding or 
concurrently with the face, or can be information the judge has long known about the person 
whose face is being judged; and (d) can be an isolated bit of information (e.g., an image of a gold 
medal presented in isolation). 
A wide variety of contextual cues, such as odors, pictures, and stories, have been found to 
influence the judgments participants make regarding the emotion being experienced by another 
person  (Kim et al., 2004; Carroll & Russell, 1996; Goodenough and Tinker, 1931;  Munn, 1940; 
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Fernberger, 1928; Landis, 1929).  For example, Munn (1940) showed participants faces that 
were either presented in the surrounding context in which the photographs were initially taken or 
the identical faces presented in isolation (e.g., a photograph of a smiling person waterskiing vs. 
the smiling face in isolation) and asked participants what emotion the person was experiencing.  
Along the same lines, Carroll and Russell (1996) had participants read stories, then showed them 
a picture of a face, and then asked participants ―what emotion is the woman [man] feeling‖ (p. 
209).  In all of these studies, the investigators instructed the participant to make a judgment about 
what emotion the person in the picture was experiencing and did not ask the participant to make 
a judgment about the face.  An implicit assumption made by researchers such as Carroll and 
Russell (1996) is that the informational value attached to the face is not itself affected by the 
additional contextual information being presented, and that respondents simply weigh the two 
pieces of independent information (i.e., the face and the context) when judging what emotion the 
person is experiencing.   
In contrast, in the present study, rather than asking what emotion the person was feeling, 
we asked participants to indicate what the face was showing. Would the judgment of what facial 
expression is being exhibited be influenced by context as well, or are these judgments influenced 
only by facial musculature?  The goal of Study 1 was to explore this question, which has 
received relatively little attention, and is different from the question of whether context 
influences judgments of what someone is feeling.  The question of whether context influences 
judgments of facial expressions is important in part because facial expressions influence 
judgments of what people are feeling.  It is possible that context influences judgments of what 
people are feeling in two different ways: (a) directly, by influencing the judgment of what the 
person is feeling; and (b) indirectly, by influencing the judgment of what is on the face.   
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To our knowledge, only three previous studies have examined how context influences the 
judgment of what is on the face (as opposed to the many studies examining how context 
influences the judgment of what the person is feeling). Leppanen and Hietanen (2003) directly 
examined whether the judgment of the face itself is influenced by context (participants were 
instructed to ―identify which of the two emotions was presented on the screen‖), using odors as 
the context. In their design, two experiments examined how odors affect facial affect recognition 
judgments of neutral, happy and disgust emotional facial expressions. Leppanen and Hietanen 
(2003) found that participants: (a) more accurately and quickly identified happy facial 
expressions when presented along with pleasant odors than when presented along with 
unpleasant odors; and (b) more accurately identified disgust facial expressions when presented 
along with unpleasant odors than when presented along with pleasant odors, though the odors did 
not affect the latency of identifying disgust expressions.  
Righart and de Gelder (2008a) also examined how context affects the recognition of 
facial expressions. Participants viewed images composed of faces superimposed on a scene and 
were asked to categorize faces as fearful, disgusted, or happy. They found that participants had 
higher accuracy rates and faster reaction times when the emotion of the face and surrounding 
context were congruent.  Thus, while similar, the results of the studies by Leppanen and 
Hietanen (2003) and Righart and de Gelder (2008a) were not entirely consistent.  Specifically, 
whereas Leppanen and Heitanen (2003) found that the context did not affect reaction time for 
identifying disgust facial expressions, Righart and DeGelder (2008a) did. The role of context 
was also examined by Righart and de Gelder (2008b), who examined only happy and fearful 
expressions superimposed on happy, fearful, and neutral backgrounds.  They found that 
individuals viewing happy faces were faster at recognizing happy faces when they were 
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presented in happy and neutral scenes than when presented on fearful scenes; response times 
were similar for happy faces on happy vs. neutral backgrounds.  Although responses to fear faces 
on fearful backgrounds were faster than fear faces on happy and neutral backgrounds, the 
differences were not statistically significant.  The effect of context on accuracy was not 
examined due to ceiling effects. 
The present research was needed for a variety of reasons.  First, the results of the three 
previous studies were not entirely consistent. Second, the sample sizes in the previous studies 
were small (Leppanen & Heitanen: n=20 and n=45; Righart & DeGelder (2008a): n=22 and 
n=15; Righart & DeGelder (2008b): n=18), which might help explain why the results were not 
entirely consistent. Third, neither of the previous studies had examined sad expressions. Not only 
is it important to examine sadness for its own sake, but also by including multiple negative 
emotions, including sadness, we were able to test whether contextual effects are emotion specific 
or valence specific. Fourth, the previous studies examined only high intensity facial expressions. 
By choosing emotional facial expressions that are not at extreme levels of intensity, we were able 
to examine recognition patterns that are more like those in everyday interactions, and we were 
also able to avoid potential ceiling effects from very easy recognition, which was the case in 
Righart and deGelder (2008b); and (5) the previous studies explicitly directed participants’ 
attention to the context -- by not explicitly directing participants’ attention to the context we 
were able to examine processing which is closer to how daily facial affect recognition judgments 
are probably made.   
A second, related, goal of the present research was to develop a task for measuring 
nonverbal emotional processing that could be used by researchers in a variety of settings and 
studying a variety of populations. The task used by Leppanen and Hietanen (2003) used odors as 
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context, which are not emotion-specific and are more complicated to use than visual images 
presented on a computer monitor.  The task used by Righart and DeGelder (2008a and 2008b) 
did not include sad expressions or sad context, used facial expressions of high intensity which 
could lead to ceiling effects, and used faces that were not racially diverse.  Thus, we developed a 
task that addressed all of these issues.   
To summarize, we developed a novel task that enabled us to test the hypothesis that 
individuals’ judgments concerning facial expressions (what is on the face), as well as how 
quickly those judgments are made are influenced not only by the facial expression but also by 
context.  We hypothesized that participants would have: (1) higher accuracy rates and faster 
reaction times when the emotion of the face matches the emotion of the context; and (2) lower 
accuracy rates and slower reaction times when the emotion of the face mismatches the emotion 
of the context.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 321 university students (60% female) ranging in age from 18 to 23 (M 
= 19.0, SD = 1.0).  The ethnic composition of the sample was as follows: 64.3% European 
American/White, 8.3% African American/Black, 12.6% Asian American, 8.3% Latino/a, 4.3% 
Bi-racial, and 2.1% non-disclosing.  Participants received course credit in return for 
participating.   
Procedure 
In a single session, participants completed the facial affect recognition task described 
below and a series of questionnaires (not examined in the present paper).  
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Facial Affect Recognition  was measured using the Contextual Recognition of Affective 
Faces Task (CRAFT), developed for this research, in which participants view faces displaying 
different facial expressions (i.e., neutral, happiness, fear, sadness, and disgust) superimposed 
upon emotionally valenced (i.e., happiness, fear, sadness, and disgust) and neutral images.   
The context images upon which the facial expressions were superimposed were selected 
following pilot testing in which participants (n=73) made two types of ratings of images (n=104) 
selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, and Cuthbert, 
1999) and selected from publicly available online images.  Each image was rated on a 1 to 5 
Likert Scale for each of the 6 emotions, as well as neutral. Participants read the following 
instructions on the computer screen: ―You will be shown 104 images. Each will appear briefly 
for about 2 seconds. After they disappear you will be asked to rate how much each expresses 
anger, sadness, disgust, fear, happiness, surprise, or is neutral on a scale from 1 to 5 with "1" 
meaning no emotion and 5 meaning extreme emotion.‖  In addition, pilot participants made a 
forced choice rating for each image – instructions were: ―After you rate each individual emotion, 
you will then be asked to choose which category best describes the image (whether it best 
expresses anger, sadness, disgust, fear, happiness, surprise, or is neutral).‖ To be included in the 
final version of the CRAFT, an image had to receive an average rating of at least 3.5 (1 = absent; 
5 = extreme) on the corresponding emotion, and at least 60% of participants correctly identified 
the emotion in a forced choice task.   Eight context images for each of four emotions (happy, sad, 
fear, and disgust) plus 24 neutral context images met the inclusion criteria and were chosen for 
the CRAFT.  Examples of context images included in the CRAFT are: a hand holding a gun, a 
shark, a tornado scene (fear); a beach, cute puppies, fireworks (happy); bugs on food, a 
dismantled arm, a bloody scene (disgust); a casket, a cemetery, a funeral procession (sadness); a 
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coat rack, a filing cabinet, a desk lamp (neutral).  Averaging across the images, happy images 
were rated happy 83.5% of the time, disgust images were rated disgust 78.4%, sad images were 
rated sad 83.5%, fear images were rated fear 67%, and neutral images were rated neutral 93%.   
Although anger and surprise context images were included in the pilot testing, anger and 
surprise images were not included in the CRAFT task because none of the images met the 
inclusion criteria.  We were unable to find context images that were considered representative of 
anger (and not other emotions) that did not also include in them other facial expressions of 
emotion that confused participants as to which face they were to judge.  Surprise was not 
included because we were unable to find context images that were considered representative of 
surprise and not other emotions, most likely because surprise typically ‖merges into fear, 
amusement, relief, anger, disgust‖ (Ekman, 2003, p. 148).     
The facial expressions were selected from among faces used in other research in our lab. 
For our previous research, facial expressions were created by preparing six base faces varying on 
gender and ethnicity (e.g., Sub-Saharan African male, East Asian female) with Poser 6 
(SmithMicro), and then morphing each face to create facial expressions of emotion. Each 
emotional expression was then morphed to adjust intensity levels (e.g., the group of muscles that 
move to create a smile – action unit 12 – was increased in magnitude for happy expressions). 
Finally, each expression was varied on five levels of intensity of emotion. An expression was set 
at 100% intensity and then adjusted to represent 20, 40, 60 and 80% of that expression to give 
five levels of intensity.    
For this specific task, we chose a subset of the faces. Given the extensive research 
showing that some emotions are more easily recognized than others (e.g., Hess, Blairy, & Kleck, 
1997; Spencer-Smith et al., 2001), we took steps to reduce differences in recognition difficulty 
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across emotions; specifically, we selected the following levels of intensity for each emotion: 
disgust 80% and 100%; fear 60% and 80%; sad 40% and 50%; happy 30% and 50%.  Although 
the accuracy rates across emotions were not perfectly matched, we chose the two intensities for 
each emotion that would prevent floor and ceiling effects (such as the ceiling effects found by 
Righart and deGelder, 2008b). Please see Figure 2.1 for examples of these faces. Thus, for each 
emotion (happy, sad, fear, disgust) there were 12 faces [2 (male/female) x 3 (Sub-Saharan 
African/East Asian/European) x 2 (level of intensity)], and there were 6 neutral faces [2 
(male/female) x 3 (Sub-Saharan African/East Asian/European)]; thus there were 54 different face 
images.  To verify that the facial expressions of emotion were recognizable, four undergraduate 
students were asked to indicate for each of the eight emotional facial expressions (i.e., two sad, 
two fear, two disgust, two happy) which two were sad, which two were fearful, and so on; this 
sorting task was completed six times, once for each face type (e.g., male African, female 
European).  Three of the four students correctly sorted every single face, and the fourth student 
made two errors; thus sorting accuracy was 98.6 percent across the four students. 
 
 
Disgust 80% Disgust 100% 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Examples of facial expressions used in the CRAFT 
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Fear 60% Fear 80% 
 
 
Happy 30% Happy 50% 
  
Sad 40% Sad50% 
  
Figure 2.1 (cont.). Examples of facial expressions used in the CRAFT 
 
The CRAFT is composed of 168 trials (each of the 54 face images was presented three 
times – once paired with a neutral background image, once paired with the matching emotion 
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context image, and once paired with a mismatching emotion context image).  The order in which 
the 168 trials were administered was randomized separately for each participant.  On each trial, 
the participant is presented with a single face image superimposed upon a single emotionally 
valenced or neutral image. All context images covered the entire computer monitor; the size of 
the face superimposed upon the context image was identical in all trials.  Participants responded 
using a keyboard that had five keys labeled with the following emotions: ―happy,‖ ―sad,‖ ―fear,‖ 
―disgust,‖ and ―neutral.‖  Participants had to select, by pressing one of the five labeled keyboard 
keys (using the index finger of their dominant hand), which of the aforementioned labels most 
accurately described the emotional expression on the face. They read the following instructions 
on the screen: ―You will be seeing 168 sets of images. Each image is made up of a background 
picture and a picture of a face. The faces will appear in different locations on the screen. Your 
task is to decide which of the five emotional expressions is being shown by the face.‖   
Participants were given practice trials to learn the position of the answer keys (the 
emotion words) on the keyboard.  There were six different orders that the emotions appeared to 
reduce order effects. For example, one participant may have the far left keyboard key represent 
the emotion fear, whereas another participant’s far left keyboard key was for the response happy.  
Once all of the practice trials were completed, they were given the instructions ―Please choose 
which emotion best describes the facial expression.‖ Both accuracy and response latency were 
measured.  Following Kerns and Berenbaum (2000), reaction times shorter than 300 ms were 
eliminated. RTs were also removed from analyses if they were: (1) smaller than or larger than 3 
standard deviations of the group grand mean; and/or (2) smaller than or larger than 3 standard 
deviations of the individual participant’s mean. Finally, a log linear transformation was used on 
the RT data to correct for skewness/kurtosis. 
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There were 3 context conditions: matching (both face and image are the same emotion), 
mismatching (face and image are different emotions), and neutral (emotional face on a neutral 
image). Figure 2.2 shows examples of each context condition. Each type of emotional facial 
expression (happy, sad, fear and disgust) was presented 36 times (12 times in the matching 
condition, 12 mismatching, and 12 neutral), and neutral facial expressions were presented 24 
times (12 matching and 12 mismatching). For example, for fear facial expressions: (a) 12 fear 
faces on fear images were presented; (b) 12 fear faces on mismatching contexts (4 on happy 
contexts, 4 on sad contexts, and 4 on disgust contexts) were presented; and (c) 12 fear faces on 
neutral contexts were presented.  Images were displayed on the screen until the participant made 
a response. As soon as the participant made a response, the next face superimposed on an image 
would appear
. 
There were multiple positions where the face could be located (top or bottom left, 
top or bottom right, or center). Multiple positions were used so that the participant would have to 
scan each image.  Had the face always been placed in the same position, participants might have 
used a strategy of focusing exclusively on the face (whose location they would have easily 
learned) and ignoring the background context information – such a strategy was preempted by 
moving the position of the face around across trials. The locations of the faces were 
counterbalanced to make sure that each emotional expression was not more likely to be in one 
location (e.g., the right) than another (e.g., the left).   
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Matching 
Context: 
Fear Face on Fear 
Context Image 
 
 
 
Mismatching 
Context: 
Happy Face on Fear 
Context Image 
 
 
 
Neutral 
Context: 
Sad Face on Neutral 
Context Image 
 
Figure 2.2. Examples of face/context image pairings used in the CRAFT 
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Results 
 As expected, the facial expressions tended to be recognized correctly.  Specifically, for 
neutral backgrounds, happy expressions were recognized 63 percent of the time, sad expressions 
64 percent of the time, fear expressions 72 percent of the time, and disgust expressions 57 
percent of the time.  Averaging across context conditions, the happy expressions were 
recognized 63 percent of the time, sad expressions 65 percent of the time, fear expressions 75 
percent of the time, and disgust expressions 60 percent of the time.  Thus, we were reasonably 
successful in our attempts to minimize accuracy differences across emotions and to prevent floor 
and ceiling effects. Please see Table 2.1 to see a breakdown of accuracy for each emotional 
expression across each emotional context.   
 
 
 
Table 2.1. Proportion accuracy for each emotional facial expression for each emotional context 
     FACE   
  Fear Disgust Happy Sad 
 Fear  .83 .57 .58 .58 
Context Disgust .67 .70 .65 .59 
 Happy .68 .53 .63 .57 
 Sad .73 .50 .67 .72 
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To examine the impact of context on accuracy, we conducted a 3 (Context Condition: 
match vs. mismatch
1
 vs. neutral) x 4 (Emotion on the face: happy vs. sad vs. fear vs. disgust) 
repeated measures ANOVA. There were significant effects for both context, F (2, 319) =78.58, p 
<.01, eta
2
=.33, and emotion on the face, F (3, 318) =77.83, p <.01, eta
2
=.42.  In addition, there 
was a significant context x emotion on the face interaction, F (6, 315) =47.50, p <.01, eta
2
=.48.  
As can be seen in Figure 2.3, participants tended to be most accurate when the context and face 
matched on emotion and least accurate when context and face were mismatched on emotion.  
Separate post-hoc contrasts (paired t-tests) were conducted for each emotion (i.e., happy, sad, 
fear, and disgust) comparing matching vs. mismatching, matching vs. neutral, and mismatching 
vs. neutral accuracy rates. Given the 9 contrasts conducted, we used a Bonferroni correction to 
cut the alpha, resulting in an alpha of p < .006.  For sad, fear and disgust, all contrasts had a p < 
.0001 except for the disgust mismatch vs. neutral contrast (p = .008). In contrast, as can be seen 
in Figure 2.3, accuracy for happy faces was not influenced by context.  Happy contrasts were 
examined separately, and p > .9 for all comparisons. 
 
                                                          
1
  The mismatch score was calculated by averaging across all of the different mismatching emotional contexts (e.g., 
for a sad facial expression, mismatching emotional contexts would be happy, fear, and disgust expressions). 
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Figure 2.3. Proportion accuracy for matching, mismatching, and neutral contexts 
 
To examine the impact of context on RT, we again conducted a 3 (Context Condition: 
match vs. mismatch vs. neutral) x 4 (Emotion on the face: happy vs. sad vs. fear vs. disgust) 
repeated measures ANOVA.  There were significant effects for both context, F (2, 302) =47.90, 
p <.01, eta
2
=.24, and emotion on the face F (3, 301) =73.74, p <.01, eta
2
=.42.  In addition, there 
was a significant match x emotion interaction, F (6, 298) =8.79, p <.01, eta
2
=.15.  As can be seen 
in Figure 2.4
2
, for all four emotional faces, participants tended to respond more slowly when the 
context mismatched the face, and tended to respond more quickly when the context matched the 
face.    The match x emotion interaction reflects the effect of match varying across emotions; for 
example, the difference between match and mismatch was much larger for happy than for sad 
facial expressions.  
 
                                                          
2
  The particular emotion used as context had a large effect on RTs (average Cohen’s d = 1.12), whereas it had only 
a small effect on accuracy (average Cohen’s d = .25).  Consequently, to illustrate the effect of the degree to which 
match vs. mismatch of context influenced RTs, we adjusted the RTs based on the average RT for each individual 
context emotion.  For example, the adjusted RT for disgust faces with matching context was computed as the 
average RT for disgust faces with disgust context divided by the average RT for all faces with disgust context. 
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Figure 2.4. Adjusted reaction time for matching, mismatching, and neutral contexts 
 
 
Discussion 
We developed a task that could be easily used by researchers in a variety of settings, with 
a variety of populations, to study the effects of context on facial affect recognition. While many 
studies have shown that context influences judgments of what individuals are feeling (e.g., Kim 
et al., 2004; Carroll & Russell, 1996; Goodenough and Tinker, 1931; Munn, 1940; Fernberger, 
1928; Landis, 1929), only three previous studies had examined whether context influences 
judgments of what is on the face (Leppanen & Hietanan, 2003; Righart & DeGelder, 2008a,b).  
Like the three previous studies, we found that context generally matters in facial affect 
recognition judgments, though there are some inconsistent findings across studies. As 
hypothesized, we found that individuals were generally more accurate when the emotion of the 
face and context matched and were less accurate when they mismatched. However, emotional 
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context was not associated with accuracy of decoding happy facial expressions.  The absence of 
context effects for accuracy of decoding happy facial expressions cannot be attributed to ceiling 
effects, because accuracy rates for happy expressions were lower than for other emotional facial 
expressions.  One possible explanation is that the effects of context on accuracy are especially 
valuable when distinguishing among emotions of the same valence, and since happiness was the 
only positively valenced emotion in this task, context did not play a role in accuracy of 
identifying happy facial expressions.  Also as hypothesized, participants were faster at making 
facial affect recognition judgments when the emotion of the face and context matched than when 
they mismatched.  Perhaps the most important finding in this study is that it is not just the 
valence of the contextual information that matters, but rather the specific emotion that matters.  
Our research went beyond previous research in three significant ways. First, we examined 
a broader range of emotions than had been examined in previous research.  Second, including a 
larger number of emotions allowed us to examine if facial affect recognition accuracy and RT 
varied as a function of valence or specific emotions. The third way in which we went beyond 
previous research was that the instructions and task demands did not explicitly direct the 
participant’s attention to the context as had been done in previous research (i.e., Leppanen & 
Hietanan, 2003).  The reason this is important is that in real life, individuals’ attention is not 
typically directed to contextual information explicitly.  
That context influences facial affect recognition judgments has two important 
implications. First, our results suggest that when making judgments about which emotion an 
individual is feeling, facial expressions and other relevant information are not judged 
independently and then combined.  Instead, the judgment of the facial expression is itself 
influenced by the contextual information.  In all likelihood, the judgment of the contextual 
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information is also influenced by the facial expression.  Second, our results have implications for 
developing models of facial affect recognition.  That facial musculature influences facial affect 
recognition judgments is well established.  Previous research has found evidence of other aspects 
of the face, such as its race and gender (e.g., Elfenbein & Ambady; 2002; Hugenberg, 2005), 
influencing facial affect recognition judgments.  The results of this study indicate that there are 
factors other than the face that can influence facial affect recognition judgments.   
Given that research such as ours has demonstrated that the judgment of the emotion on 
the face is not made independently of contextual information, the next step for future research is 
to explore how and why this happens. For example, it will be important to determine whether the 
contextual information affects the perceiver’s mood which in turn affects the judgments.  Even if 
the impact of contextual information on facial affect recognition is mediated by mood, the effects 
of mood on facial affect recognition are undoubtedly mediated by cognitive processes.  Thus, it 
will also be critical to determine whether contextual information directly or indirectly (via mood) 
alters: (a) which information on the face is attended to, how quickly, and for how long; and/or 
(b) how the information on the face, once attended to, is utilized; and/or (c) the process by which 
the judgment is made.   Additionally, it will be important for future research to explore the 
different facets/dimensions of context to see how different types of context affect the processing 
of emotional information differently. For example, future research should continue to explore 
how visual contextual information can affect judgments differently than olfactory or auditory 
contextual information.  It will also be important to explore how other aspects of context, such as 
its timing (e.g., context presented prior to the face vs. context presented concurrently, as was the 
case in the present research) and relevance (e.g., directly connected to the face being judged vs. 
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independent of the face being judged, as was the case in the present research), affect facial affect 
recognition.    
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Chapter 3 
Study 2: The Relation between Emotional Numbing and Sensitivity to Emotional Context 
 
PTSD often results in individuals having disrupted emotional experiences ranging from 
restrictions in the ability to feel or experience emotion (emotional numbing) to experiencing 
physiological arousal and negative affect (NA) in response to memories of their trauma (APA, 
1994). As described by Litz and Gray (2002), ―chronic PTSD entails an admixture of intrusive 
negative affects and problems with emotional experience and expression, particularly positive-
feeling states‖ (p. 203).  The present research focused on one specific emotional disturbance 
associated with PTSD, a restricted range of affect, otherwise known as emotional numbing (EN).  
EN has been found to be related to a decrease in resiliency resources for individuals with trauma 
exposure (Johnson, Palimieri, Jackson, & Hobfoll, 2007), and to be closely associated with 
interpersonal impairment in individuals with war-zone related PTSD (Ruscio, Weathers, King, & 
King, 2002), suggesting that further research on EN is warranted.   
Numerous papers have examined the relation between EN symptoms and other PTSD 
symptoms (e.g., Yoshihama & Horrocks, 2005; flack et al., 1997), including many factor analytic 
studies (e.g., Palmieri, Weathers, Difede, & King, 2007b).  Whereas there are numerous studies 
examining whether individuals with PTSD process emotional information differently than do 
individuals without PTSD (e.g., research using Stroop paradigms; Thomas & Fremouw, 2009; 
Kimble, Frueh, & Marks, 2009; Beck et al., 2001; McNally, English, & Lipke, 1993), to our 
knowledge only one study has examined how individuals with different levels of EN perform on 
tasks that involve the processing of emotional information (Milanak & Berenbaum, 2009).  
Because PTSD and EN are not isomorphic (e.g., an individual can have EN without having 
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PTSD; an individual can have PTSD without having EN), finding that PTSD is (or is not) 
associated with the processing of emotional information does not necessarily mean that EN is (or 
is not) associated with the processing of emotional information.  Consequently, our knowledge 
of how emotional processing is associated specifically with EN remains quite limited.  The 
present research examined the relation between EN and the effect of emotional context on the 
processing of emotional information. 
Several hypotheses have been proposed regarding the etiology of EN.  Three hypotheses 
regarding EN lead to very different predictions regarding the relation between EN and the effect 
of emotional context on the processing of emotional information.  One theory of EN (Keane et 
al., 1985), which drew heavily on learning theory, proposed a conditioning model in which EN is 
viewed as avoidance behavior. Individuals learn to avoid painful memories and emotions by 
feeling numb, and they are rewarded by not experiencing pain. If Keane et al’s (1985) proposed 
avoidance model of EN is correct, one would expect that: (a) individuals with high levels of EN 
should avoid attending to emotional contexts that could be potentially threatening and would 
therefore be less affected by emotional context due to avoidance; and (b) any associations found 
between EN and the processing of emotional information should not be specific to EN – rather, 
any associations found with EN should also be found for avoidance.   
A second model of EN (Litz et al., 1997), influenced by the relation between EN and 
other symptoms of PTSD, proposed that EN is the result of the emotional depletion caused by 
chronic hyperarousal.  If Litz et al.’s (1997) model of EN is correct, any associations found 
between EN and the processing of emotional information should not be specific to EN—rather, 
any associations found with EN should also be found for hyperarousal. A third model of EN 
(Milanak & Berenbaum, 2009) was influenced by the results of a study examining the relation 
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between EN and performance on a word naming priming task.  Milanak and Berenbaum (2009) 
found that EN was associated with the degree to which participants took advantage of valence 
information to accelerate the processing of subsequently presented similarly valenced stimuli. 
The results of Milanak and Berenbaum (2009) suggest that differences in emotional processing 
between individuals with low vs. high levels of EN are most evident when examining how 
exposure to one emotional stimulus influences the processing of other emotional stimuli.  In 
other words, evidence of EN being associated with the processing of emotional information only 
became evident when taking into account emotional information that was presented prior to the 
presentation of the emotional target.   Milanak and Berenbaum (2009) did not find a main effect 
for EN or an EN x target interaction.  Instead, they found that the EN x non-target interaction 
was associated with the processing of emotional information.   The finding that the association 
between EN and emotional processing was only evident when taking into account the non-target 
emotional prime, suggests that EN is associated with how individuals respond to the temporal 
sequence, or flow, of emotional information.  This, in turn, led Milanak and Berenbaum (2009) 
to posit that EN is associated with disturbances in emotion regulation processes rather than 
simply disturbances in emotional responsivity (as indexed by responses to emotional stimuli 
presented in isolation).  If Milanak and Berenbaum’s (2009) hypothesis about EN is correct, one 
would expect to find an association between EN and the impact of emotional context on the 
processing of emotional information. 
To study if and how EN is associated with the processing of emotional information, we 
took advantage of previous research documenting that accuracy judging facial expressions of 
emotion tends to be enhanced when the faces are presented in an emotion-matching context, and 
tends to be diminished when the faces are presented in an emotion-mismatching context 
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(Leppanen & Hietenan, 2003; Righart & DeGelder, 2008; see Chapter 2). To the best of our 
knowledge, no previous research has examined whether any aspect of psychopathology, 
including symptoms of PTSD, are associated with the degree to which emotional processing is 
influenced by concurrent emotional context. Although facial affect recognition has not been used 
to examine emotion processing as often as have tasks such as the emotional Stroop, facial affect 
recognition has been shown to be effective in delineating emotional processing differences in 
individuals with psychopathology (e.g., mood disorders (e.g., Hale, 1998; Gur et al., 1992) and 
anxiety disorders (e.g., McClure et. al., 2003))
3
. In fact, based on the evidence suggesting that 
typical emotional images influence information processing more strongly than do typical 
emotional words (Beall & Herbert, 2008; DeHouwer & Hermans, 1994), several 
psychopathology researchers (Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue, & Joormann, 2004; Mogg & Bradley, 
2005) have recommended using images rather than words.   
To summarize, the goal of the present research was to examine the relation between EN 
and the effect of emotional context on the processing of emotional information.  In so doing, we 
hoped to shed light on three hypotheses/models of EN: (a) the Keane et al. (1985) avoidance 
model; (b) the Litz et al. (1997) hyperarousal model; and (c) the Milanak and Berenbaum (2009) 
emotional sequence/flow model.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 90 university students (72% female) ranging in age from 18 to 22 (M = 
18.8, SD = .9) who had direct trauma exposure (130 students were screened).  The ethnic 
                                                          
3
 Several studies have employed facial expressions of emotion when studying PTSD.  For example, researchers have 
examined cortical responses (measured using ERP and fMRI) of individuals with PTSD to emotional facial 
expressions (e.g., Ehlers et al., 2006; Shin et al., 2005) and memory biases for hostile faces (Paunovic et al., 2003)). 
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composition of the sample was as follows: 56.7% European American/White, 14.4% Asian 
American, 10% African American/Black, 10% Latino/a, 3.3% Bi-racial, and 5.6% non-
disclosing.  Participants received course credit in return for participating.  The most common 
trauma types were transportation accidents, physical assault, or the sudden, unexpected death of 
someone close to them. 
Procedure 
In a single session, participants completed the facial affect recognition task described 
below and a series of questionnaires.  
Psychological Trauma.  Participants completed the Life Events Checklist (Gray, Litz, 
Hsu, & Lombardo, 2004), a self-report checklist that measures exposure to potentially traumatic 
life events. Individuals in this sample personally experienced a range of traumatic life events 
(between 1 and 6) with the mean number of events being 2.6. 
  Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder symptomology was assessed using the PTSD Checklist 
Civilian version (PCL-C; Weathers et al., 1993) which measures the frequency of the 17 PTSD 
symptoms included in the DSM-IV. Individuals in this study had PCL scores ranging from 17 to 
79 with an average PCL score of 34.6 (SD = 12.2). The highest score possible (rating all 17 
symptoms as a extremely severe) would be a score of 85. A score of 34 would mean an average 
rating of a 2 (a little bit) for each of the 17 symptoms; however, it is also possible for individuals 
to rate some symptoms high and others low and still obtain a score of 34. Therefore, the average 
score in this sample is indicative of moderate levels of PTSD symptoms. Moderate to strong 
correlations have been found between the PCL and other PTSD measures (Weathers et al., 
1993). The PCL-C has been validated in a variety of civilian samples (e.g., Ruggiero et al., 2003; 
Walker et al., 2002; Smith et al., 1999).  
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 Emotional Numbing scores were calculated by averaging the responses on the PCL-C to 
the 5 PTSD symptoms that comprise the EN symptom factor (Palmieri, Weathers, Difede, & 
King, 2007): restricted affect, diminished interest, detachment, foreshortened future, and 
amnesia. Scores ranged from 5 to 24, with a mean EN score of 8.8 (SD = 4.0).  Analyses were 
conducted using the continuous variable, but for graphing purposes, high and low EN groups 
were created (as described in greater detail below).  The results of the analyses reported below 
did not change when we used the 3-item EN symptom factor (restricted affect, diminished 
interest, and detachment), leaving out foreshortened future and amnesia. 
Effect of Context on Emotional Processing was measured using the Contextual 
Recognition of Affective Faces Task (CRAFT; see Chapter 2), in which participants view faces 
(male and female faces of Sub-Saharan African, East Asian, and European decent) displaying 
different facial expressions (i.e., neutral, happiness, fear, sadness, and disgust) superimposed 
upon emotionally valenced (i.e., happiness, fear, sadness, and disgust) and neutral images.   
  The CRAFT is composed of 168 trials (each of the 54 face images was presented three 
times – once paired with a neutral background image, once paired with the matching emotion 
context image, and once paired with a mismatching emotion context image).  The order in which 
the 168 trials were administered was randomized separately for each participant.  On each trial, 
the participant is presented with a single face image superimposed upon a single emotionally 
valenced or neutral image. All context images covered the entire computer monitor; the size of 
the face superimposed upon the context image was identical in all trials.  Participants responded 
using a keyboard that had five keys labeled with the following emotions: ―happy,‖ ―sad,‖ ―fear,‖ 
―disgust,‖ and ―neutral.‖  Participants had to select, by pressing one of the five labeled keyboard 
keys (using the index finger of their dominant hand), which of the aforementioned labels most 
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accurately described the emotional expression on the face. They read the following instructions 
on the screen: ―You will be seeing 168 sets of images. Each image is made up of a background 
picture and a picture of a face. The faces will appear in different locations on the screen. Your 
task is to decide which of the five emotional expressions is being shown by the face.‖   
Following Kerns and Berenbaum (2000), reaction times shorter than 300 ms were 
eliminated. RTs were also removed from analyses if they were: (1) smaller than and/or larger 
than 3 standard deviations of the group grand mean; and/or (2) smaller than and/or larger than 3 
standard deviations of the individual participant’s mean. Finally, a log linear transformation was 
used on the RT data to correct for skewness/kurtosis. 
There were 3 context conditions: matching (both face and image are the same emotion), 
mismatching (face and image are different emotions), and neutral (emotional face on a neutral 
image). Each type of emotional facial expression (happy, sad, fear and disgust) was presented 36 
times (12 times in the matching condition, 12 mismatching, and 12 neutral), and neutral facial 
expressions were presented 24 times (12 matching and 12 mismatching). For example, for fear 
facial expressions: (a) 12 fear faces on fear images were presented; (b) 12 fear faces on 
mismatching contexts (4 on happy contexts, 4 on sad contexts, and 4 on disgust contexts) were 
presented; and (c) 12 fear faces on neutral contexts were presented.  Images were displayed on 
the screen until the participant made a response. As soon as the participant made a response, the 
next face superimposed on an image would appear
4. 
There were multiple positions where the face 
could be located (top or bottom left, top or bottom right, or center). Multiple positions were used 
so that the participant would have to scan each image.  Had the face always been placed in the 
same position, participants might have learned over trials to focus exclusively on the face and to 
ignore the background context information).  
                                                          
4
 Examples of the combinations of images and facial expressions are available upon request. 
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Results 
As expected, collapsing across all participants, there was a significant effect of context, χ2 
(df = 2) = 57.67, p < .001, with performance tending to be most accurate in the match condition 
(average accuracy = 78 percent) and less accurate in the mismatch and neutral conditions (64 
percent for both).   
Having found that individuals respond more accurately in the match condition, we 
proceeded to examine if context effects would be moderated by PTSD symptoms.  To do so we 
conducted a 3 (Within-Subjects Context Condition: match vs. mismatch vs. neutral) x 4 (PTSD 
symptom clusters: re-experiencing vs. avoidance vs. emotional numbing vs. hyperarousal; these 
were treated as continuous between-subjects variables) repeated measures analysis of variance, 
using the number of correctly identified facial expressions of emotion in each condition as the 
dependent variables
5
.  As predicted, there was a significant Context x EN interaction, 
F(2,84)=5.43, p=.006, eta
2
=.115.  There were no significant main effects or interactions 
involving the other PTSD symptoms.  We also re-ran the analysis including NA, and the context 
x EN interaction remained significant (F(2,84)=5.43, p=.006, eta
2
=.114) providing evidence that 
the interaction was not better accounted for, nor could be explained away, by NA. The results 
remained the same when running separate analyses for each symptom factor instead of entering 
all four symptom factor scores in a single analysis.  Supplementary analyses did not reveal any 
evidence of the EN x Context interaction being moderated by the type of emotion on the face
6
.  
                                                          
5
 Analyses were conducted for each emotional facial expression separately, and no significant results emerged. 
Therefore, we collapsed across emotion of the face for the reported results. 
6
 The 3 x 4 ANOVA was also run for an EN factor composed of 3 symptoms (excluding amnesia and foreshortened 
future), and the Context x EN interaction was still significant (p=.04, eta2=.075). 
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 The nature of the EN x Context interaction is illustrated in Figure 1, in which we present 
facial affect recognition accuracy in the three conditions for individuals with lower levels of EN 
(defined as little to no endorsement of EN symptoms; i.e., scores of 8 or less out of 25 on the 
sum of EN symptoms, average EN score = 6.2) and higher levels of EN (defined as moderate or 
higher endorsement of EN symptoms; i.e., scores of 9 or higher on the sum of EN symptoms, 
average EN score = 12.6). As can be seen in Figure 3.1, individuals with higher levels of EN 
were more affected by the context than were individuals with lower levels of EN. Specifically, 
compared with individuals with lower levels of EN, individuals with higher levels of EN were 
more accurate when the emotion of the face and the background were the same or when the 
background was neutral (no emotion), and less accurate when the emotion of the face and 
background were not the same. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Facial affect recognition accuracy across the three context conditions for individuals 
with higher and lower levels of EN. 
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Parallel analyses examining RT rather than accuracy did not reveal any significant 
symptom main effects or context x symptom interactions.  Thus, it is unlikely that the significant 
accuracy results are reflective of speed-accuracy trade-offs. 
 
Discussion 
The present research examined the relation between EN and the effect of emotional 
context on the processing of emotional information in the hopes of shedding light on three 
hypotheses/models of EN: (a) the Keane et al. (1985) avoidance model; (b) the Litz et al. (1997) 
hyperarousal model; and (c) the Milanak and Berenbaum (2009) emotional sequence/flow 
model. The results of the current study supported the Milanak and Berenbaum (2009) hypothesis. 
Consistent with previous research (Milanak & Berenbaum, 2009), the results of the present study 
indicate that EN is associated with the processing of emotional information. Specifically, we 
found differences in emotional processing between individuals with low vs. high levels of EN 
when examining their judgments of emotional facial expressions presented in the context of 
emotional images.  Compared to individuals with lower levels of EN, individuals with higher 
levels of EN had heightened sensitivity to emotional context; they benefited more (were more 
accurate) when the emotion of the face and background matched and were harmed (less accurate) 
when they mismatched. This provides additional evidence that EN is associated with how 
individuals are affected by non-target emotional stimuli when responding to target emotional 
stimuli. Additionally, the finding that an individual factor of PTSD was related to disturbances in 
emotional processing when other PTSD factors were not provides support for examining specific 
factors of PTSD separately instead of just exploring PTSD as a whole. 
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Both Milanak and Berenbaum (2009) and the current research found that EN is 
associated with emotional information processed in the context of other emotional information. 
Interestingly, however, while Milanak and Berenaum (2009) found that individuals with higher 
levels of EN were under-influenced by emotional context, the present research found that 
individuals with higher levels of EN were over-influenced by emotional context.  In other words, 
in both the previous research and the current study, we found that it was not a main effect for EN 
nor was there an EN by target stimulus interaction. It was the EN x non-target interaction that 
was significant. There are several possible explanations for these differences.  First, the current 
research presented emotional stimuli concurrently, whereas Milanak and Berenbaum (2009) 
presented emotional stimuli one after the other.  Second, the current study employed facial 
expression and visual image stimuli, whereas Milanak and Berenbaum (2009) employed verbal 
cues (words read on the screen). Third, the task used in the current research (CRAFT) was a task 
that explicitly focused participants’ attention on emotion, whereas Milanak and Berenbaum 
(2009) did not include any emotional ratings in the task. Thus, it will be worthwhile for future 
research to examine, in the same set of participants: (a) emotional stimuli presented both 
concurrently and subsequently; (b) responses to both verbal and non-verbal emotional stimuli; 
and (c) performance on tasks that do and do not explicitly focus participants’ attention on 
emotion.  
The results of the present study were not consistent with what would have been 
anticipated based on the other two hypotheses/models of EN. Specifically, for the Keane et al. 
(1985) model, one would have expected individuals with high levels of EN to avoid attending to 
emotional contexts that could be potentially threatening/provoking painful thoughts and 
memories. In contrast, however, individuals with higher levels of EN were more strongly 
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affected by the emotional context (positively and negatively valenced alike) than were 
individuals with lower levels of EN. Also, based on the Keane et al. (1985) model, one would 
have expected that any associations found between EN and the processing of emotional 
information would not have been specific to EN, but would instead be mirrored by avoidance. 
However, there was no significant context by avoidance interaction. Similarly, for Litz et al.’s 
(1997) model, one would have expected that any associations found between EN and the 
processing of emotional information would not have been specific to EN, but would instead be 
mirrored by hyperarousal.  However, there was no significant context by hyperarousal 
interaction. The heightened sensitivity to emotional context was specific to individuals with 
higher levels of EN, not hyperarousal, therefore not supporting what would have been expected 
based on Litz’s (1997) model.  Of course, our results in no way suggest that EN and 
hyperarousal are independent; they do, however, suggest that EN and hyperarousal are 
differentially associated with emotional processing. 
Knowing that individuals with PTSD may or may not experience EN, and that not all 
individuals who experience EN after a traumatic life event develop PTSD, we chose to examine 
EN separately from PTSD (even though the majority of previous research has examined PTSD as 
a whole). We found that one specific symptom factor, EN, was associated with the processing of 
emotional information.  This finding may be useful clinically for several reasons.  First, it alerts 
clinicians to the potential deficits and/or biases that their PTSD clients may have if they are 
experiencing EN.  Second, it alerts clinicians to potential emotional deficits and/or biases of 
clients who do not meet diagnostic criteria for PTSD, but who happen to be experiencing EN.  
Finally, understanding how individuals with EN process emotional facial expressions in context 
(which is equivalent to how most faces are viewed and perceived in everyday life) is useful for 
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clinicians because facial expressions play an integral role in interpersonal relationships 
(Nachson, 1995). 
While the results of the current study provide further support for EN being associated 
with emotional context and emotional processing, it will be important for future research to 
explore the specific mechanism that underlies this relation. One way to examine the mechanism 
affecting emotional processing and attention is to use eye-tracking (measuring eye 
movements/saccades and fixation duration). Specifically, as individuals complete the CRAFT 
task, every eye movement and the duration that they fixate on any part of the image could be 
recorded to examine if individuals with higher or lower levels of EN spend more time looking at 
the faces or the background images, and whether this ―attention‖ allocation changes with 
different conditions. It is possible, for example, that the context directs attention toward the face 
or draws attention away, both of which can affect accuracy. Further, what gets attended to may 
depend on the emotional congruence of the image and face emotions, and PTSD symptoms, such 
as EN.  Additional research strategies, such as measuring event related potentials while 
participants are processing emotional information, are also likely to provide clues to the 
mechanism underlying the association between EN and emotional processing. 
Both the current and our previous research examined groups of individuals with a variety 
of traumatic experiences. As a result, it seems unlikely that our findings are specific to a single 
type of trauma. Nonetheless, future research should examine the relation between EN and 
emotional processing in specific trauma experiences since it is possible that the mechanism 
responsible may be differentially influenced by the type of trauma. Additionally, it should be 
noted that this research used a student sample, not a treatment seeking sample. Nonetheless, we 
were able to obtain a wide range of reported EN symptom severity/frequency.  However, 
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individuals with extremely high levels of EN were probably underrepresented in our sample, just 
as individuals with extremely low levels of EN would likely be underrepresented in a treatment-
seeking sample. We predict that samples that include large numbers of individuals with both 
very low and very high levels of EN will reveal even stronger associations between EN and 
emotional processing than those found in the present study.   
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Chapter 4 
Study 3: Trauma, PTSD, Emotional Processing, and Eyetracking 
 
According to the DSM-IV (APA, 1994), a traumatic event is characterized as an event 
that poses a potential or actual threat of death and/or serious injury or an actual or potential threat 
to one’s physical integrity. Examples of a traumatic event include: transportation accidents, 
physical assault with or without a weapon, sexual assault, sudden death of someone close to you, 
and military and warzone exposure. Sadly enough, a large portion of individuals in the United 
States have experienced a traumatic event at some point in their lifetime. In large 
epidemiological studies, Resnick et al. (1993), Kessler et al. (1995), and Breslau (2009) found 
that approximately three-quarters of the population has experienced a traumatic life event. 
Furthermore, Breslau (2009) reported that slightly less than 10% of trauma victims developed 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), an anxiety disorder that can develop following a traumatic 
life experience. 
PTSD often results in individuals having disrupted emotional experiences including 
restrictions in the ability to feel or experience emotion (emotional numbing) (APA, 1994). 
Therefore, numerous researchers have examined how PTSD is associated with disturbances in 
emotional processing. Investigators have consistently found that individuals with PTSD differ 
from controls in their processing of emotionally valenced stimuli.  Using modified versions of 
the emotional Stroop task, researchers have generally found that individuals with PTSD respond 
differentially to threat words associated specifically with the type of trauma they experienced 
(e.g., words such as crash or highway for individuals who develop PTSD following motor 
vehicle accidents), but do not respond differentially to other threat, positive, or neutral words 
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(e.g., McNally, English, & Lipke, 1998; Thrahser & Dalgleish, 1994).  Given that recent research 
has suggested that typical emotional images influence information processing more strongly than 
do typical emotional words (Beall & Herbert, 2008; DeHouwer & Hermans, 1994), several 
psychopathology researchers (Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue, & Joormann, 2004; Mogg & Bradley, 
2005) have recommended using images rather than words.  In fact, psychopathology researchers 
are now using facial expressions of emotion more frequently to examine emotional processing 
(e.g., Hale, 1998; Gur et al., 1992; McClure et. al., 2003).  
Four previous studies have found that the accuracy of judging facial expressions of 
emotion tends to be enhanced when the faces are presented in an emotion-matching context, and 
tends to be diminished when the faces are presented in an emotion-mismatching context 
(Leppanen & Hietenan, 2003; Righart & DeGelder, 2008; see Chapter 2). However, Milanak and 
Berenbaum (Chapter 2) found that emotional context was not associated with accuracy of 
decoding happy facial expressions.  Milanak and Berenbaum (Chapter 3) took advantage of these 
findings and used a contextual facial affect recognition task to study if and how specific 
symptom factors of PTSD (e.g., emotional numbing, avoidance) are associated with the 
processing of emotional information in individuals with trauma histories. They found that only 
one symptom factor of PTSD, emotional numbing (EN), was associated with the degree to which 
context influenced facial affect recognition.  Specifically, Milanak and Berenbaum (Chapter 3 
found differences in emotional processing between individuals with low vs. high levels of EN 
when examining their judgments of emotional facial expressions presented in the context of 
emotional images.  Compared to individuals with lower levels of EN, individuals with higher 
levels of EN had heightened sensitivity to emotional context; they benefited more (were more 
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accurate) when the emotion of the face and background matched and were harmed (less accurate) 
when they mismatched.  
Although the results of Milanak and Berenbaum (chapter 3) suggest a link between EN 
and the impact of emotional context on facial affect recognition, the precise mechanism(s) 
underlying this relation remains unknown. One way to examine the factors that influence the 
processing of emotional information is to use eye-tracking (measuring eye movements/saccades 
and fixation duration). Specifically, as individuals complete a facial affect recognition task, 
every eye movement and the duration that they fixate on any part of the face and/or a 
background context image can be recorded. We can then examine if individuals with higher or 
lower levels of the four PTSD symptom factors (i.e., EN, avoidance, hyperarousal, and re-
experiencing) spend more time looking at the faces or the background images, and whether this 
―attention‖ allocation changes with different conditions (e.g., the emotion of the face matches the 
emotion of the background context, the emotional face is presented on a neutral image). If 
individuals with higher and lower levels of PTSD symptoms show similar patterns of scanning 
and fixation, we can begin to posit that the differences in behavioral responses (e.g., accuracy 
and RT) are attributed to how the visual information is processed after it has been attended to. 
On the other hand, if differences in scanning and fixation are detected, we can begin to 
hypothesize that the underlying mechanism contributing to differences in accuracy and RT are 
due to different patterns of obtaining emotional information, not just differential processing of 
that emotional information. It is possible, for example, that the context directs attention toward 
the face or draws attention away, both of which can affect accuracy. Further, what gets attended 
to may depend on the emotional congruence of the image and face emotions, and PTSD 
symptoms, such as EN or hyperarousal.   
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In summary, the present research utilized eyetracking to examine how individuals with 
trauma histories perceive and process emotional information, specifically emotional facial 
expressions presented in the context of emotional images. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 98 university students.  Because we were interested in individuals with 
trauma histories, we limited our analyses to those 76
7
 individuals who had direct trauma 
exposure and who met PTSD Criterion A (the assessments of which are described below).  
Participants included in the analyses (54% female) ranged in age from 18 to 30 (M = 19.4, SD = 
1.7). The ethnic composition of the sample was as follows: 55% European American/White, 32% 
Asian American, 5% Latino/a, 4% African American/Black, and 4% Bi-racial.  Participants 
received course credit in return for participating.   
Procedure 
In a single session, participants completed the facial affect recognition task described 
below, a UFOV (useful field of view) task described below, and a series of questionnaires (not 
all will be examined in this paper).  
Effect of Context on Emotional Processing was measured using the Contextual 
Recognition of Affective Faces Task (CRAFT; see Chapter 2), in which participants view faces 
(male and female faces of Sub-Saharan African, East Asian, and European decent) displaying 
different facial expressions (i.e., neutral, happiness, fear, sadness, and disgust) superimposed 
upon emotionally valenced (i.e., happiness, fear, sadness, and disgust) and neutral images.   
                                                          
7
 Participants in this research (Study 3) were different than those in Studies 1 and 2. 
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  The CRAFT is composed of 168 trials (each of the 54 face images was presented three 
times – once paired with a neutral background image, once paired with the matching emotion 
context image, and once paired with a mismatching emotion context image).  The order in which 
the 168 trials were administered was randomized separately for each participant.  On each trial, 
the participant is first presented with a screen with a fixation cross, and then a single face image 
superimposed upon a single emotionally valenced or neutral image which remained on the screen 
for 5 seconds. All context images covered the entire computer monitor; the size of the face 
superimposed upon the context image was identical in all trials.  After 5 seconds the image 
disappeared and a new screen listing the five emotion labels was presented. This prompt 
remained on the screen until participants responded using a keyboard that had five keys labeled 
with the following emotions: ―happy,‖ ―sad,‖ ―fear,‖ ―disgust,‖ and ―neutral.‖  Participants had 
to select, by pressing one of the five labeled keyboard keys (using the index finger of their 
dominant hand), which of the aforementioned labels most accurately described the emotional 
expression on the face. After they made their choice, the screen with the fixation cross appeared 
again. They read the following instructions on the screen: ―You will be seeing 168 sets of 
images. Each image is made up of a background picture and a picture of a face. The faces will 
appear in different locations on the screen. Your task is to decide which of the five emotional 
expressions is being shown by the face.‖   
Following Kerns and Berenbaum (2000), reaction times shorter than 300 ms were 
eliminated. RTs were also removed from analyses if they were: (1) smaller than and/or larger 
than 3 standard deviations of the group grand mean; and/or (2) smaller than and/or larger than 3 
standard deviations of the individual participant’s mean. Finally, a log linear transformation was 
used on the RT data to correct for skewness/kurtosis. 
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There were 3 context conditions: matching (both face and image are the same emotion), 
mismatching (face and image are different emotions), and neutral (emotional face on a neutral 
image). Each type of emotional facial expression (happy, sad, fear and disgust) was presented 36 
times (12 times in the matching condition, 12 mismatching, and 12 neutral), and neutral facial 
expressions were presented 24 times (12 matching and 12 mismatching). For example, for fear 
facial expressions: (a) 12 fear faces on fear images were presented; (b) 12 fear faces on 
mismatching contexts (4 on happy contexts, 4 on sad contexts, and 4 on disgust contexts) were 
presented; and (c) 12 fear faces on neutral contexts were presented.  Images were displayed on 
the screen until the participant made a response. As soon as the participant made a response, the 
next face superimposed on an image would appear
. 
There were multiple positions where the face 
could be located (top or bottom left, top or bottom right, or center). Multiple positions were used 
so that the participant would have to scan each image.  Had the face always been placed in the 
same position, participants might have learned over trials to focus exclusively on the face and to 
ignore the background context information).  
Psychological Trauma.  We operationalized the experience of psychological trauma as 
the individual having indicated that they personally experienced a stressful/traumatic event. The 
Life Events Checklist (Gray, Litz, Hsu, & Lombardo, 2004), a self-report checklist that measures 
exposure to potentially traumatic life events, lists the 17 most common stressful/traumatic 
experiences that  individuals could encounter (e.g., transportation accidents, sudden, unexpected 
death of someone close to them, natural disaster, sexual or physical abuse). Participants rate each 
of the potentially stressful/traumatic events as to whether: (1) it happened to them (direct trauma 
exposure), (2) they witnessed it; (3) they learned about it; (4) they do not remember; or (5) it 
does not apply.  The most common trauma types reported by participants in this study were 
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natural disasters, transportation accidents, unwanted sexual experiences, and sudden, unexpected 
death of someone close to them. The mean number of traumatic life events experienced by 
participants was 2.8 (ranging from 1 to 10 traumatic life experiences). 
Criterion A was assessed using a questionnaire created for this study. Participants 
reported which of the life events that they experienced directly (as indicated on the Life Events 
Checklist) was the most traumatic, when it occurred, if there was actual or threat of death, injury, 
or threat to physical integrity for themselves or others; and they also reported if they responded 
to the traumatic event with feelings of horror, helplessness, and/or intense fear.  The responses of 
all 76 participants who endorsed having directly experienced a traumatic event indicated that 
they met Criterion A. 
PTSD sequelae were measured using the PTSD Checklist – Civilian version (PCL; 
Weathers, Litz, Herman, Huska, & Keane, 1993), a self-report questionnaire measuring 
frequency and severity of the 17 PTSD  symptoms as defined by the DSM-IV (APA, 1994).  
Symptoms include re-experiencing (nightmares, flashbacks), avoiding people and places that 
remind them of the event, feeling emotionally numb, and being easily startled. Participants rate 
each symptom on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely).  Researchers such as Blanchard, 
Jones-Alexander, Buckley, and Forneris (1996) have shown evidence that the PCL is 
psychometrically strong (e.g., an alpha of .94 for the total scale) (also see Ruggiero, Del Ben, 
Scotti & Rabalais, 2003). 
Eye tracking. We used the EyeLink II eye tracker which is a commercially-available eye 
tracker. The EyeLink II eye tracker (which records eye position every 2 msec) is a device that 
reflects infrared light off the lens and the cornea of the eye.  The lens, cornea, and other parts of 
the eye absorb a small amount of energy from the infrared light, but the energy is less than 1% of 
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the Maximum Permissible Exposure level as certified by the American Standards Institute (ANSI 
Z 136.1-1973).  This is about as much energy as you get on a bright sunny day. As individuals 
complete the CRAFT task, every eye movement and the duration that they fixate on any part of 
the image will be recorded. To define a fixation, the eyelink program uses an algorithm that 
picks out participant blinks and saccades. The remaining periods of time between blinks and 
saccades are labeled as fixations. 
For each facial expression of emotion for each type of background image, we examined 
the: (1) fixation location (whether they were fixating within the interest area (the area of the face) 
or outside the interest area (fixating on the background)); (2) total number of fixations; (3)total 
number of saccades (how many times they move their eyes and scan the entire image); and (4) 
amplitude of the saccades.  
We divided the number of fixations that an individual made within the interest area (i.e., 
fixations on the face) by the number of total fixations made on correct trials. Proportion scores 
were calculated for each context condition (match, mismatch, and neutral) collapsed across 
emotions, as well as for each individual emotion for each context (e.g., happy faces on happy 
contexts, sad faces on fear contexts). 
Useful Field of View (UFOV) was measured using a task in which participants searched 
for a white triangle within a circle among square distracters in a briefly presented (11ms) display. 
Targets were arranged in eight radial spokes around a square in the center of the display, and 
they occurred with equal probability on each arm at eccentricities of 10
o
, 20
o
, and 30
o
 from the 
center of fixation. After the target item was presented, a mask display consisting of random black 
and white lines and shapes was presented for 5 ms. After the mask display disappeared, a new 
screen appeared showing lines representing the eight radial arms prompting participants for a 
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response. Subjects had to select the correct radial arm on which the target had appeared. 
Accuracy of responses was recorded. Participants completed 24 practice trials (with a 
presentation duration of 170 ms) followed by 120 experimental trials. 
Results 
 To determine if there was any association between individual PTSD symptom clusters 
and participants’ useful field of view (UFOV; the area in which an individual can perceive visual 
information without turning or moving their head), we conducted a mixed factors ANOVA with 
eccentricity as a within subjects factor (10, 20, and 30 degrees) and PTSD symptom factors (re-
experiencing, avoidance, EN, and hyperarousal) as continuous between-subjects factors. There 
was a main effect for eccentricity (F=3.58 (2, 55), p<.05, eta2=.12) with lower accuracies at 
higher eccentricities (Means = .46, .35, and .27, respectively, for 10, 20, and 30 degrees). There 
were no effects for PTSD symptoms or any significant interactions. 
To examine the impact of context on the proportion of fixations looking at the face, we 
conducted a 3 (Within-Subjects Context Condition: match vs. mismatch vs. neutral) x 4 (Within-
Subjects Emotion on the face: happy vs. sad vs. fear vs. disgust) x 4 (PTSD symptom clusters: 
re-experiencing vs. avoidance vs. emotional numbing vs. hyperarousal; these were treated as 
continuous between-subjects variables) repeated measures analysis of variance. Consistent with 
our previous research, there was a significant main effect for context, F=10.01 (2,70), p<.01, 
eta
2
=.22. Across all emotions, individuals spent the most time fixating on the face (the highest 
proportion of fixations) when the background context was neutral (M = .201, SD = .052) 
compared to mismatching (M = .194, SD = .046) and matching (M = .186, SD = .047) conditions.  
There was also a significant main effect for emotion, F=3.27 (3,69), p<.05, eta
2
=.12.  Individuals 
spent the lowest proportion of fixations on the sad faces (.16), followed by fear faces (.19), then 
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happy faces (.21), and the highest proportion on disgust faces (.22). There was also a significant 
context x emotion 2-way interaction, F=6.90 (6,66), p<.01, eta
2
=.39.  
For the context x emotion interaction, as can be seen in Figure 4.1, there was a different 
pattern of fixations for each emotion. The patterns of disgust and fear were relatively similar, 
with the greatest number of fixations for mismatching trials.  In contrast, for happiness, there 
were far more fixations for neutral trials than for matching and mismatching trials.  There were 
relatively few fixations of the sad face, with context condition making little difference. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Context x Emotion interaction for proportion of fixations on the face 
 
Follow-up post-hoc repeated measures ANOVAs were run to examine differences in 
context effects for each individual emotion. There was a significant context effect for happy 
faces (F=82.14 (2, 74), p < .01, eta2 = .69), fear faces (F = 32.30 (2, 74), p < .01, eta
2
 = .47), 
disgust faces (F=21.71 (2, 74), p <.01, eta
2
=.37), and sad faces (F=5.84 (2, 74), p < .01, eta
2
 = 
.14). We then conducted paired-samples t-tests to compare individual contexts within each 
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emotion. There were 75 degrees of freedom for each analysis. The majority of the comparisons 
were significant at p < .01. In addition, for fear faces, there was a significant difference between 
match and neutral contexts at p < .05. Also, there were two comparisons that were not 
significant: match and mismatching contexts for happy faces and match and neutral contexts for 
sad faces.   
In terms of PTSD symptoms, there was a significant Context x Hyperarousal 2-way 
interaction, F=3.33, p<.05, eta
2
=.09, and trends for Emotion x Re-experiencing: F=2.50 (3,69), 
p=.07, eta
2
=.10 and Emotion x Avoidance: F=2.46 (3,69), p=.07, eta
2
=.10.  Finally, there was a 
significant Emotion x Avoidance x Context 3-way interaction, F=2.56 (6,66), p<.05, eta
2
=.19, 
and a trend toward a 3-way Context x Emotion x EN interaction, F=1.84 (6,66), p=.11, eta
2
=.14. 
The nature of the Context x Hyperarousal interaction is illustrated in Figure 4.2, in which 
we present the proportion of fixations within the interest area (i.e., on the face) for accurate trials 
for individuals with lower levels of hyperarousal (defined as little to no endorsement of 
hyperarousal symptoms; i.e., scores of 9 or less out of 25 on the sum of hyperarousal symptoms, 
average hyperarousal score = 6.9) and higher levels of hyperarousal (defined as moderate or 
higher endorsement of hyperarousal symptoms; i.e., scores of 10 or higher on the sum of 
hyperarousal symptoms, average hyperarousal score = 12.4). As can be seen in Figure 4.2, 
individuals with higher levels of hyperarousal generally spent less time looking at the face and 
more time looking at the context than did individuals with lower levels of hyperarousal. This 
difference was especially pronounced for neutral contexts. Follow-up post hoc correlations 
showed that the proportion of fixations on faces in the neutral context condition was significantly 
correlated with hyperarousal (r = -.27, p<.05), but was not significantly correlated with 
hyperarousal for matching or mismatching contexts (r = -.08, p=.50 and r = -.16, p =.18, 
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respectively). Correlations were compared using the formula recommended by Meng, Rosenthal, 
and Rubin (1992). The correlation between hyperarousal and fixations when the context was 
neutral differed significantly from the correlation between hyperarousal and fixations when the 
context was matching, z=2.26, p = .01, and differed, albeit not significantly, from the correlation 
between hyperarousal and fixations when the context was mismatching, z=1.18, p = .12. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Proportion of fixations on the face for each context for individuals with lower and 
higher levels of hyperarousal 
 
 The nature of the Emotion x Re-experiencing interaction is shown in Figure 4.3. As can 
be seen in Figure 4.3, individuals with higher levels of re-experiencing spent less time fixating 
on the face than individuals with higher levels of re-experiencing for disgust, fear, and sad faces. 
However, there was very little difference in fixation proportion between individuals with higher 
and lower levels of re-experiencing for happy faces. Post-hoc correlations were conducted, and 
there were no significant correlations between re-experiencing and any of the individual 
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emotions. We again compared the correlations using the formula suggested by Meng, Rosenthal, 
and Rubin (1992).The differences in magnitudes of correlations were generally weak.  The 
biggest difference was between re-experiencing and fixations for happy faces and re-
experiencing and fixations for fear faces, z = 1.15, p = .13. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Proportion of fixations on the face for individuals with lower and higher levels of re-
experiencing for each emotional facial expression 
 
 Figure 4.4 illustrates the Emotion x Avoidance interaction. As can be seen in Figure 4.4, 
individuals with high levels of avoidance fixated on disgust, happy, and sad faces less than did 
individuals with lower levels of avoidance. In contrast, individuals with high levels of avoidance 
fixated on fear faces more than did individuals with lower levels of avoidance. There were no 
significant findings for post-hoc follow up correlations between avoidance and any of the 
individual emotions. When comparing the correlations (Meng, Rosenthal, & Rubin, 1992) the 
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biggest difference was between: (1) avoidance and fear faces vs. avoidance and happy faces, z = 
-1.47, p = .07. 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Proportion of fixations on the face for individuals with lower and higher levels of 
avoidance for each emotional facial expression 
 
 There was evidence of the Avoidance x Emotion interaction being further moderated by 
context.  Follow up repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted to further explore the nature of 
this trend for a 3-way interaction. We ran 4 (emotion: sad vs. fear vs. disgust vs. happy) x 4 
(PTSD symptom factors: re-experiencing vs. avoidance vs. EN vs. hyperarousal) repeated 
measures ANOVAS for each context condition separately. The Avoidance x Emotion interaction 
described above was especially pronounced in the mismatching condition, F = 4.73, p < .01, eta
2
 
= .17, and was not significant in the matching or neutral conditions.  As can be seen in Figure 
4.5, the pattern described in Figure 4.4 above was even more pronounced in the mismatching 
condition. 
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Figure 4.5. Proportion of fixations on the face within the mismatching context condition for each 
emotion for individuals higher and lower levels of avoidance 
 
Follow up repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted to further explore the nature of 
the marginally-significant Context x Emotion x EN 3-way interaction. We ran 3 (within-subjects 
context match vs. mismatch vs. neutral) x 4 (PTSD symptom factors: re-experiencing vs. 
avoidance vs. EN vs. hyperarousal) repeated measures ANOVAS for each emotion separately. 
For happy faces, there was a significant 2-way Context x EN interaction, F=3.07 (2,70), p=.053, 
eta2=.08, whereas the Context x EN interactions were not significant for any of the other 
emotions.   
As can be seen in the Figure 4.6, for matching trials, individuals with higher levels of EN 
attended to the happy face more than did individuals with lower levels of EN, whereas for 
neutral trials, individuals with lower levels of EN attended to the happy face more than did 
individuals with higher levels of EN. For mismatching conditions, there was almost no 
difference between individuals with higher and lower levels of EN in the proportion of fixations 
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on the face. Follow up post-hoc correlations did not reveal any significant associations between 
EN and fixations within any of the context conditions. However, when comparing the 
correlations (Meng, Rosenthal, & Rubin, 1992) there was a  significant difference between the 
correlation for EN and fixations in matching contexts for happy faces compared to the 
correlation for EN and fixations in neutral contexts for happy faces, z = -1.90, p = .03.  
 
 
Figure 4.6. Proportion of fixations on happy faces for each context condition for individuals with 
higher and lower levels of EN 
To examine the impact of context on the accuracy of facial affect recognition (and to 
potentially replicate findings from our previous research), we conducted a 3 (Within-Subjects 
Context Condition: match vs. mismatch vs. neutral) x 4 (Within-Subjects Emotion on the face: 
happy vs. sad vs. fear vs. disgust) x 4 (PTSD symptom clusters: re-experiencing vs. avoidance 
vs. emotional numbing vs. hyperarousal; these were treated as continuous between-subjects 
variables) repeated measures analysis of variance. There were no significant interactions, which 
was not consistent with previous findings. 
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Discussion 
We utilized eyetracking with a contextual facial affect recognition task (the CRAFT) to 
explore the association between emotional processing and PTSD symptoms. We found that each 
of the four PTSD symptom factors were differentially related to aspects of emotional processing, 
and that individuals with higher and lower levels of PTSD symptoms showed different fixation 
patterns across contexts and emotions. For example, we found that individuals with higher levels 
of hyperarousal spent less time looking at the face and more time looking at the context than did 
individuals with lower levels of hyperarousal. This difference was especially pronounced for 
neutral contexts. One possible explanation for this finding is that, characteristic of hyperarousal 
symptoms, individuals high in hyperarousal are constantly scanning the background context 
checking for potential threat cues. Once they have accurately identified the emotion of the face 
and recognize that it is not threatening, it is possible that they do not spend any additional time 
staring at the face because the face does not provide them with any additional information about 
the situation. An alternative potential explanation is that individuals with higher levels of 
hyperarousal focus on what is least emotionally arousing. For example, the faces may be more 
arousing than much of the background, and for neutral contexts, the background is substantially 
less arousing than the emotional facial expressions. 
We found that individuals with higher levels of re-experiencing spent less time fixating 
on negative faces than did individuals with lower levels of re-experiencing. In contrast, there was 
very little difference in fixations on happy faces between individuals with higher and lower 
levels of re-experiencing. Thus, individuals with elevated levels of re-experiencing seem to be 
sensitive to negative faces.  One possible explanation for this finding is that the negative facial 
expressions act as a trigger causing the individual to re-experience negative thoughts, feelings, 
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and emotions. By fixating on the background contexts, they are avoiding the negative triggers. 
Also, because happy faces would not be expected to be threatening or to trigger any negative 
memories or emotions, individuals with higher levels of re-experiencing would not direct their 
attention away from them. 
Whereas re-experiencing was found to be associated with all unpleasant faces, avoidance 
was associated with a heightened sensitivity to only fear faces. Specifically, we found that 
individuals with higher levels of avoidance fixated on fear faces for a higher proportion of the 
time compared to individuals with lower levels of avoidance. One possible explanation for this 
pattern of fixations is that fear faces have the most threat value because they are associated with 
fear experiences. Therefore, individuals with higher levels of avoidance are more likely to fixate 
for longer periods of time on fear faces since they are the most fear relevant. This would also 
explain why this pattern of responding is more prominent during the mismatching contexts. 
During mismatching trials for fear faces, none of the context images include fear. Consequently, 
in such trials the fear faces are the most relevant fear information. In other words, when only 
non-fear contexts and fear face are present, the fear face has a much higher threat value, which is 
why individuals with higher levels of avoidance are particularly likely to attend to the faces. 
We also found that on matching context trials individuals with higher levels of EN tended 
to fixate on happy faces more than did individuals with lower levels of EN, whereas for neutral 
trials, individuals with lower levels of EN fixated on the happy faces more than did individuals 
with higher levels of EN. One possible explanation is that individuals with higher levels of EN 
are less interested in and less attentive to pleasant emotional information (as has been suggested 
by Litz et al., 1997). Whereas individuals with lower levels of EN tend to fixate on whatever is 
most pleasant because they are especially interested in and attentive to pleasant information, the 
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same is not true for individuals with higher levels of EN. Specifically, for neutral context 
conditions, the only pleasant emotional information is the face, and therefore, individuals with 
lower levels of EN tend to fixate on the face more than do individuals with higher levels of EN. 
Individuals with higher levels of EN are not particularly interested in the pleasant information, 
and therefore do not tend to fixate on the face (the only source of pleasant information for neutral 
trials with happy faces). In matching context conditions, there are happy faces as well as pleasant 
context backgrounds. Since the background is especially pleasant, probably more than the faces, 
individuals with lower levels of EN will devote less time to the faces and more time to the 
pleasant context, whereas individuals with higher levels of EN (compared to individuals with 
lower levels of EN) pay more attention to the happy faces and less attention to the context (since 
they are not drawn to the emotional stimulus with the most pleasant emotional information). 
This study did not replicate our previous finding that individuals with higher levels of EN 
were more affected by the emotional context than individuals with lower levels of EN (Chapter 
3). In fact, we did not find any relation between PTSD symptoms and accuracy rates. One 
possible explanation is that in this study we changed an important aspect of the CRAFT. In our 
previous research, the face appeared on the screen until the individual made the forced choice 
decision pressing a key to indicate which emotion was on the face. The CRAFT had to be 
adapted for use with the eyetracker; the face/context image was shown on the screen for 5 
seconds, and then a second screen was shown with the emotion choices. Also, in between trials, 
participants viewed a screen with a fixation cross instead of the next trial immediately appearing. 
It is possible that the null results regarding accuracy varying as a function of PTSD symptoms 
and context was a result of individuals having a much longer time period to view the face and the 
background context image before making a decision. It appears that having more time to make a 
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judgment had a significant impact on accuracy rates overall, as evidenced by much higher 
accuracy rates in this study (78 % across emotions and contexts) compared to the previous two 
studies using the CRAFT (68 % and 69 % in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively). This change in the 
task is also why we were unable to examine reaction time. 
The results of the current study provide additional evidence that PTSD symptoms are 
associated with the processing of emotional information, suggesting that it is important to 
examine individual symptoms of PTSD rather than just examining PTSD as a whole.  It will be 
important for future research to more thoroughly explore the specific mechanisms that underlie 
the associations between PTSD symptoms and emotional processing. One limitation of the 
current research is that we have only begun to scratch the surface examining scanning and 
fixation patterns. For instance, future research should examine: (1) fixation duration to face (how 
long they look at a particular part of the face); (2) fixation duration to background image (how 
long they look at the total background or portions of the background – how long do they fixate 
on the gun in the picture vs. the hand holding the gun, for example); and (3) number of 
saccades/eye movements back and forth between looking at the face and looking at the 
background context. 
For facial affect recognition methodologies, future research using eye-tracking should 
examine RT to see if scanning and fixation patterns differ when an individual has to make a 
―split-second‖ real-time decision. Additional research strategies, such as measuring event related 
potentials while participants are processing emotional information, are also likely to provide 
clues to the mechanisms underlying the associations between individual PTSD symptoms and 
emotional processing. It will also be important to examine how different types of traumas may 
lead to different scanning and fixation patterns as well. This research has begun to shed light on 
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the relations between individual PTSD symptom factors and emotional processing.  Future 
research is warranted to eventually help us develop conceptual models of PTSD and PTSD 
symptoms and their associations with emotional processing. 
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Chapter 5 
General Discussion 
 
Over two-thirds of the population has been exposed to at least one traumatic life event 
during their lifetime (Resnick et al., 1993; Breslau, 2009), and approximately 10% of these 
individuals develop PTSD (Breslau, 2009). My research, which has been examining emotional 
processing and its relation to PTSD, is distinct in two ways. First, I have examined individual 
symptom factors of PTSD, not just PTSD as a whole. Second, I have examined how the relation 
between PTSD symptom factors and the processing of emotional stimuli is affected by other 
emotional information (i.e., non-target emotional stimuli) presented in conjunction with, or 
immediately preceding, the target emotional stimuli.  
 It will be important to further unpack the nature of PTSD symptoms, and what other 
sequelae of trauma should be included beyond the current 17 symptoms listed in the DSM-IV-
TR (APA, 1994) (e.g., dissociation, guilt or shame reactions, etc.). Knowing that each individual 
experiences a different combination of symptoms post-trauma, it is hard to believe that there are 
only 17 symptoms that define PTSD and that are sufficient to optimally measure PTSD. As 
additional symptoms emerge, it will be important to develop new factor models of PTSD. One 
current issue is that the EN symptom factor is composed of five symptoms (restricted affect, 
diminished interest, detachment, foreshortened future, and amnesia), but two of those symptoms 
are not directly related to emotion (foreshortened future and amnesia). As new symptoms 
emerge, it will be important to develop new conceptualizations of symptom factors and 
structures.  
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In addition to identifying other sequelae of trauma, a related area warranting future 
inquiry is the measurement of PTSD symptoms. The majority of researchers use standard 
questionnaires and self-report measures to assess PTSD symptoms. The Clinician Administered 
PTSD Scale (CAPS; Blake et al., 1995; Weathers, Keane, & Davidson, 2001; Weathers, Ruscio, 
& Keane, 1999) has proven to be a useful interview tool, but as has been suggested in the 
literature (Palmieri, Weathers, Difede, & King, 2007b), some individuals are not comfortable 
disclosing personal information about their traumas to researchers whom they do not know and 
are more honest on self-report questionnaires. This was one suggested possibility for why 
different factor models emerged when different types of measurement were used (Palmieri, 
Weathers, Difede, & King, 2007b). Currently, the self-report questionnaire that is most 
commonly used is the PTSD checklist (PCL; Weathers, Litz, Herman, Huska, & Keane, 1993). 
This measure asks participants to indicate how frequently they experience symptoms, and 
severity is inferred from frequency. This can present a problem because an individual may have 
unwanted memories daily, for example, but these memories are not extremely distressing. 
Therefore, development of more thorough self-report measures is needed.  
Additional work is also needed regarding the measurement of trauma and PTSD Criterion 
A.  The current most commonly used self-report measure for identifying traumatic life 
experiences, the Life Events Checklist (LEC; Gray, Litz, Hsu, & Lombardo, 2004), gets an 
accurate account of whether or not someone experienced the 17 most common traumatic life 
events. However, no information about the details of the traumatic event is obtained. For 
example, an individual may endorse experiencing a natural disaster because a tornado passed by 
10 miles away, which most individuals would not consider being traumatic. Similarly, someone 
may have endorsed being in a transportation accident after having a mild fender bender which 
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most individuals would not consider being traumatic. Also, if someone chooses item 17, ―other‖, 
we have no idea what type of event occurred that the individual considered traumatic. According 
to the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 1994) in order for an event to be classified as traumatic and therefore 
meet qualification criteria for PTSD Criterion A,  that event must have included a serious threat 
of death, injury or threat to one’s physical integrity, and the event must have resulted in 
emotional responses of helplessness, horror, or intense fear. It is important to measure Criterion 
A directly instead of assuming that when someone endorses having experienced a stressful life 
event that it actually met criteria to qualify as traumatic (and would meet the qualifications of 
Criterion A). It is possible that when conducting research including individuals who have had 
direct exposure to traumatic life events, we are actually including individuals who did not 
experience an event that would be classified as genuinely traumatic according to DSM-IV-TR 
standards. Such inclusion can add ―noise‖ to the data.  
 Apart from examining trauma and PTSD symptoms, the processing of emotional 
information in its own right is another area that still warrants further research and exploration. 
There is much room to develop new ways of measuring emotional processing beyond the Stroop 
task and the CRAFT. For example, it will be useful to not only use static faces but to also utilize 
dynamic (moving) faces when using facial affect recognition to study emotional processing. 
However, it is important to note that research on emotional processing must expand beyond just 
individual words and faces. Along with using different types of stimuli, it will also be important 
to continue to attend to differences in emotional processing when examining the effect of non-
target emotional stimuli on the processing of target emotional stimuli. Also, researchers should 
be open to examining a variety of dependent variables such as EEG and fMRI, not just accuracy 
66 
 
and RT. It is quite possible that differences will emerge when examining emotional processing 
beyond just accuracy and response times. 
 Given that the judgment of the emotion on the face is not made independently of 
contextual information, future research needs to explore how and why this happens. For 
example, it will be important to determine whether the contextual information affects the 
perceiver’s mood which in turn affects the judgments.  Even if the impact of contextual 
information on facial affect recognition is mediated by mood, the effects of mood on facial affect 
recognition are undoubtedly mediated by cognitive processes.  Thus, it will also be critical to 
determine whether contextual information directly or indirectly (via mood) alters: (a) which 
information on the face is attended to, how quickly, and for how long; and/or (b) how the 
information on the face, once attended to, is utilized; and/or (c) the process by which the 
judgment is made.    
Additionally, it will be important for future research to explore the different 
facets/dimensions of context to see how different types of context affect the processing of 
emotional information differently. For example, future research should continue to explore how 
visual contextual information can affect judgments differently than olfactory or auditory 
contextual information.  It will also be important to explore how other aspects of context, such as 
its timing (e.g., context presented prior to the face vs. context presented concurrently, as was the 
case in the present research) and relevance (e.g., directly connected to the face being judged vs. 
independent of the face being judged, as was the case in the present research), affect facial affect 
recognition. 
 When examining the processing of emotional information and how it is associated with 
PTSD symptoms, it will be important to examine how deficits and/or biases can be episodic 
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compared to chronic. For example, as was suggested by Litz (1992), it is possible that different 
disturbances in emotional processing could be evident when a fear network is activated than 
when it is not activated. It will be important for future research to better understand how 
emotional processing disturbances may change depending on the situation, context, level of 
stress, or emotion the individual is experiencing. 
It will also be important to better understand directions of causality. For instance, is it 
that an individual who is exposed to a traumatic life event processes emotional information 
differently because she developed PTSD symptoms, or is it her difference in processing 
emotional information that made her more susceptible to develop PTSD symptoms in the first 
place? If someone is prone to feelings of guilt and shame, are they more likely to develop EN to 
numb the feeling or avoidance symptoms to avoid such negative emotions, or does EN or 
avoidance maintain such emotional responses? 
 As research continues to examine individual symptoms of PTSD, as well as emotional 
processing, it will be important for researchers to develop theoretically driven models of PTSD 
as well as emotional processing. Based on our findings that the processing of target emotional 
information by individuals with higher and lower levels of EN is differentially affected by the 
presentation of non-target emotional information, we propose a new model of emotional 
processing and EN (described below and illustrated in Figure 5.1).  
We have found that the impact of non-target emotional information on the processing of 
target emotional information is either enhanced or diminished among individuals with elevated 
levels of EN.  Past research has provided evidence of other individual differences that are 
associated with patterns of performance that are in opposite directions depending on task 
characteristics. For example, Altamirano, Miyake and Whitmer (2010) found that rumination is 
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associated with worse performance on a task that involves set-shifting but better performance on 
a task that requires "goal maintenance." Both were thought to reflect the same underlying 
disturbance - "mental inflexibility." Along the same lines, Kerns and Berenbaum (2010) found 
that emotionally overwhelmed individuals with high current arousal were either over- or under- 
influenced by affective information depending on the evaluative nature of the task.  Kerns and 
Berenbaum (2010) proposed that both sets of findings could be attributed to the attempts of 
overwhelmed individuals to counteract the influence of affective information.   
I propose that individuals with elevated levels of EN are extremely intolerant of 
emotional information (i.e., it makes them very uncomfortable).  When non-target emotional 
information is irrelevant, they can successfully ignore, or quickly complete the processing of, the 
emotional information (as seen in the WPT task in Milanak and Berenbaum, 2009). In such 
cases, the influence of  non-target emotional information is diminished.  However, once the level 
of emotional relevance reaches a particular threshold, individuals with higher levels of EN are no 
longer able to successfully ignore, or quickly complete the processing of. the emotional 
information.  Under such circumstances, given their sensitivity to, and intolerance of, emotional 
information in general, the impact of that emotional information is enhanced (as seen in Study 
2). In other words, EN is associated with a difference in the impact of non-target emotional 
information on processing target emotional information depending on the level of emotional 
relevance of the non-target stimulus.  This proposal is illustrated in Figure 5.1.  As can be seen in 
Figure 5.1, the slope of the relation between emotional relevance of the non-target emotional 
stimulus and the impact of the non-target emotional stimulus on the processing of target 
emotional stimuli is steeper for individuals with higher levels of EN than for individuals with 
lower levels of EN.  In other words, the increased sensitivity of individuals with elevated levels 
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of EN to emotional information  is represented by their having a steeper slope, or gradient.  
Consequently, when the emotional relevance of the non-target emotional stimulus is quite low, 
individuals with elevated levels of EN will be less strongly affected than will individuals with 
lower levels of EN.  In contrast, when the emotional relevance of the non-target emotional 
stimulus is high, individuals with elevated levels of EN will be more strongly affected than will 
individuals with lower levels of EN.   
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. The impact of non-target emotional information on the processing of target emotional 
information 
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